CITIZENS REVIEW PANEL FINAL REPORT

TABLE OF CONTENTS


I. INTRODUCTION    2

II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY    4

III. INQUIRY RESULTS    6
A.     Barriers to the Reporting of Misconduct in the Seattle Police
Department
    6
The Police Culture    6
Perceptions of Administrative Priorities    7
Location/Access to IIS Office    7
Central Command Responsibility    8
Employee Transfer/Rotation    9
B.     Mechanisms to Encourage and Support Citizens and Employees Who
Witness Misconduct    9
C.     Departmental Policies, Procedures and Training Regarding Employee
Responsibility for Disclosing and Investigating Allegations of
Misconduct    14
I.     Policies, Procedures and Training which define employee
responsibility to disclose alleged misconduct.    14
II.     Policies, Procedures and Training Programs which define
Internal Investigations Section responsibilities for investigating
allegations of misconduct    16

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS    19
A. Oversight    20
B. Leadership    25
C. Training    28
D. Rules/Process    30

IV. CONCLUSION    33

Appendix     35




CITIZENS REVIEW PANEL

FINAL REPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

    On May 7, 1999, former-Mayor Paul Schell appointed a panel of citizens to evaluate the issue of
employee accountability and the process by which reports of police misconduct are investigated
by the Seattle Police Department. The appointment of the panel followed the filing of first degree
theft charges against a police detective, accused of stealing $10,000 from the home of a Seattle
resident who died after engaging in a shoot-out with Seattle police in October, 1996. The charges
state that while the money was returned to the home and subsequently placed in evidence, the
alleged theft - which was known to a number of Seattle police officers and was reported to a
sergeant in the Department’s Internal Investigations Section - was not investigated by the
Department until March, 1999, when a homicide detective informed a King County Deputy
Prosecutor of the incident.
    The citizens panel was charged by the Mayor to:
"    Examine the barriers that give rise to the failure of employees to report misconduct, and
propose steps to ensure compliance with reporting requirements
"    Evaluate the Department’s mechanisms to encourage and support citizens and
employees who report or witness misconduct, and
"    Undertake a systematic review of Department policies, procedures and training
programs - including Internal Investigations - that define employee
responsibilities in disclosing and investigating allegations of misconduct.
    The panel was chaired by The Hon. Charles V. Johnson, retired Judge of the
King County Superior Court. Its members include Jenny Durkan, Seattle attorney and
former Executive Counsel to the Governor, Mike McKay, Seattle attorney and former
United States Attorney for the Western District of Washington, and Burdena Pasenelli,
former Assistant Director and recently retired Special Agent in Charge of the Seattle
Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Hon. Terry Carroll, former deputy
prosecutor and King County Superior Court judge who is also Seattle Police
Department Internal Investigations Auditor and Hubert G. Locke, Professor and Dean
Emeritus of the Evans School of Public Affairs at the University of Washington serve
as consultant advisors to the panel.
    To facilitate its work and to meet the requested date for submission of its final
report, the panel retained Bryce Nelson as Administrative Assistant. It also employed
as panel staff, Robert C. Evans, a 31-year veteran of the King County Department of
Public Safety, Thomas A. Harney, a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation from 1969-1997, and Martha H. Norberg, a Special Agent in the
Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue Service, 1979-1990.
    The panel itself devoted over four hundred hours to its inquiry. The work of its
consultants consumed an additional one hundred sixty hours. The panel held
seventeen half-day sessions, including one public hearing in which it took testimony
from Seattle citizens. It received more than 130 telephone and written responses to its
request for city residents to provide any information that might be useful to the panel’s
inquiry. Panel staff conducted over eighty interviews with police officers, citizens and
public officials. In addition, the panel reviewed policy and procedure manuals from
police departments, sheriffs’ offices and state police organizations from across the
country and took testimony from current and former police officials [see Appendix A
for additional documents reviewed].
    Although a single allegation of misconduct led to the formation of this panel,
its charge required a wider inquiry. Throughout its inquiry, the challenge facing the
panel was one of maintaining a sense of balance and equity - of vigorously pursuing all
allegations brought to its attention, with a determination to avoid any simplistic
prejudgments and instead to be led only by the inquiry’s outcomes.

II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
    The gravamen of our charge from the Mayor was to determine what barriers
exist to the reporting of misconduct by Seattle Police Department employees. First,
however, it is important that the panel convey to the Mayor and the citizens of Seattle
its major conclusion: despite broad citizen consultation, aggressive inquiry and
considerable media attention, the panel does not find any evidence of widespread
corruption in the Seattle Police Department. Everything the panel learned leads it to
conclude that the allegation of theft by a Seattle police detective and other allegations
of wrongdoing brought to and examined by the panel are exceptions and not the rule in
a Department which has striven, for the past thirty years, to develop and maintain
standards of professional integrity.
    While the panel found that a number of factors can deter or encourage the
reporting of misconduct, the single most important factor is whether people have
confidence that complaints will be handled thoroughly, fairly and expeditiously. The
panel has concluded that the present system has not uniformly engendered such
confidence.
    The panel has concluded that having civilian involvement in all stages of
internal investigations is a critical component for restoring public confidence in the
system. Thus, the central recommendation of our report is a change in the structure of
oversight for internal investigations. The panel also concluded that responsibility for
investigating allegations of misconduct, and when appropriate imposing discipline,
should rest with the Department and the Chief of Police. Such responsibility is the key
to accountability. In determining what structure of civilian oversight would best suit
the realities and needs of our city, the panel has considered and decided against a
variety of models from other jurisdictions, including the model of a Citizen’s Review
Board.
    Instead we recommend that the City of Seattle form an Office of Public
Accountability [OPA]. This office would subsume both the present duties of the
Internal Investigations Section [IIS] and the IIS Auditor. The Director of the OPA
would be a civilian with the requisite experience, and would be appointed by the Chief
of Police and confirmed by the City Council. The OPA would have an assistant
director. Its investigatory and clerical personnel would continue to be Department
personnel. The Director would oversee and be responsible for the investigative,
adjudicative and administrative functions of the disciplinary process, and would
recommend disciplinary actions to the Chief of Police. The Chief would be solely
responsible for the final determinations as to discipline, and may for good cause and in
writing, modify the adjudicative findings of the Director. The Director of the OPA
will enforce the rights of officers and citizens with equal diligence. Additional
policies and procedures governing the OPA are set forth below.
    As stated, the panel concluded that a number of factors influence whether
misconduct will be reported by employees or civilians. In order for the OPA or any
internal investigations system to succeed, the panel has concluded that a number of
substantive changes also must be made in the areas of leadership, policies and
procedures, and training. The message of integrity and personal responsibility must
start with the Chief of Police and be expected at every level below. It must be
supported and enforced with appropriate rules, training and discipline. The panel’s
report makes specific recommendations in each of these areas. A number of these
recommendations require immediate attention and implementation because they affect
the city’s position in contract negotiations currently in process with the police unions.
The panel believes that recommended changes in each of the three areas [leadership,
policies and procedures, and training] are essential to the success of any internal
investigation system, and should occur whether or not the city adopts the OPA model.
    The panel appreciates that its report has significant budget implications for the
city. New resources must be allocated to these endeavors and cannot simply be carved
from other areas of the police department budget. The panel concludes that there is a
much higher public cost in not having full confidence in our police and its ability to
investigate itself.
    Finally, the panel wishes to thank the many civilians and Department
employees who provided information to the panel. The issues examined by the panel
generated a deep level of response, and the panel heard from all corners and many
voices of our community. Our work would have been brief and meaningless without
this participation. The panel appreciates the personal commitment, if not personal
courage, that such participation required.

III. INQUIRY RESULTS

A.     Barriers to the Reporting of Misconduct in the Seattle Police Department
    While the panel found no widespread or systemic corruption, in those instances
where misconduct or violation of the law exists, the panel learned that some
employees are reluctant to report such misconduct. Several possible reasons for this
reluctance can be cited.
    The Police Culture : Since the recent disclosure of the alleged theft by a
Seattle Homicide detective, the phrase “Blue Code” or “Wall of Silence” has been
used to indicate the protection that police officers provide for one another. One of the
essential elements of officer safety is protection and “back-up”from fellow officers.
Without such, officers may face serious danger in the performance of their duties.
Many officers feel that their occupation isolates them from the rest of the citizenry and
that the only real support they receive in doing their jobs comes from their fellow
police officers. The nature of the job makes reliance on one another an essential part
of survival. Without this trust in one’s co-workers, it is perceived that effectively
performing the duties of a law enforcement officer would be even more difficult.
    In some larger police departments, the protection that this “Blue Code” offers
may extend to deeds of misconduct, including criminal violations. The panel has not
found, however, this to be a systemic practice in the Seattle Police Department. Both
the media and the public must be reminded, in fact, that the case which gave rise to
this inquiry came to official and subsequent, public attention because a Seattle police
officer did not observe the “Wall of Silence.” Where the panel found failures to report
misconduct, those failures can be attributed to other factors discussed below that the
panel is convinced can be remedied through changes in training and leadership
practices.
    Perceptions of Administrative Priorities : The panel found that some veteran
police personnel indicate a lack of knowledge of the regulations requiring the reporting
of misconduct, the failure of communication from executive levels of the Department
regarding the importance of ethical behavior, the lack of serious and consistent
disciplinary measures against officers who have behaved unethically, the lack of sound
ethics training at the academy, and the lack of a specific policy setting forth in clear
terms the behavior that is expected of an officer - all as reasons for the failure to report
misconduct. While some of these deficiencies may reflect perceptions as much as
reality, taken together they reflect a climate in the Department in which an unknown
number of officers believe the reporting of misconduct is not a matter of priority.
    Location/Access to IIS Office : The physical location of and access to the
office of the Internal Investigations Section [IIS] presents another barrier to the
reporting of misconduct. The Section is not located in the Public Safety Building for
positive reasons - to protect the confidentiality of complainants and to encourage both
employees and citizens to approach the office without fear or intimidation.
Unfortunately, several municipal courtrooms have located next to the IIS office, which
now keeps its door locked to ward off a stream of persons looking for the courts.
Consequently, a visitor to the IIS office must use an intercom to gain access through a
locked door and then wait in a small entrance area to be interviewed. The entire
atmosphere is not one conducive to encouraging persons who wish to file a complaint.
    Similarly, persons wishing to file equal employment opportunity [EEO]
complaints find themselves having to enter the same locked facility and pass the
offices of several IIS investigators to reach the EEO office. The EEO office was
transferred from the Police Personnel Office to the IIS - also for positive reasons.
However, its current placement in IIS has become problematic. As the Department has
acknowledged, a large number of women employees lack confidence in the
Department’s handling of EEO issues. Because misconduct must be reported to the
same supervisors and the IIS, this lack of confidence is a barrier to the filing of
complaints. There is also a widespread perception that EEO and IIS staff discuss their
cases and share information. While these may seem minor matters, they heighten the
disregard and lack of confidence many employees have for a function which, under the
best circumstances, is not highly regarded by police officers.
    Central Command Responsibility : The erosion of confidence in the IIS
complaint process is also furthered by the fact that, while the Chief of Police is
responsible for all disciplinary decisions, in practice no single person in the
Department makes the key decisions regarding discipline. Employees describe cases
in which seemingly arbitrary decisions have been made regarding whether to initiate
an investigation. The panel also found some cases that lack proper investigative
attention [e.g., failure to interview key witnesses] or cases in which disciplinary
measures of varying degrees have been applied to similar offenses. All of this
contributes to the loss of confidence in the professionalism of the process and is a
barrier to the reporting of misconduct.
    Employee Transfer/Rotation : Finally, the issue of employee transfers and
rotation of assignments has an effect on whether employees feel free to make reports
of misconduct to IIS. An officer who has been in the same unit under the same
supervisor for a long period may not be as prone to report a fellow officer for wrong-
doing as would an officer whose unit changed personnel periodically. In certain units
where the opportunity for misconduct is disproportionately high, transfers and periodic
rotation of assignments would also lessen the temptation and reduce the opportunity
for wrong-doing. The panel fully understands the need to retain expertise, especially
in highly specialized areas of criminal investigation, but the failure to transfer
employees and to rotate assignments contributed to the incident and the resultant
issues that brought about the creation of this panel.

B. Mechanisms to Encourage and Support Citizens and Employees Who Witness
Misconduct
    Every contact a citizen has with the Department will form the opinion that
citizen has regarding the efficacy of the Department’s ability to investigate its own
personnel. In today’s society, it is a reality that police officers are thrust into
numerous unpleasant and dangerous situations. By definition, if the police do their
jobs well, some people will be unhappy.
    In the main, the citizens of Seattle have confidence in their police. However,
contacts between police and citizens, on occasion, may be adversarial and give rise to
complaints directed against a particular officer. The system should and does provide
the means to identify and guard against frivolous or malicious acts against police
officers by citizens. Protecting police personnel from such harassment is an important
part of the IIS process. It is equally important that the process is open, accessible and
non-intimidating to citizens and Department employees who seek to report allegations
of police misconduct.
    During its inquiry, the panel found some complaints from citizens that merited,
but did not receive, an in-depth investigative effort. Instances were identified in which
citizens filed complaints of misconduct but no record of those complaints could be
found in IIS files. As an example, in one instance, the nature of the complaint
constituted a potential felony but, because of file-maintenance problems, the file was
not located until several inquiries had been made to the Department. The file indicated
that the complaint had been processed as a Supervisory Referral - a disposition of an
“allegation of misconduct that is minor and, even if proven, would not constitute a
significant violation of any policy, procedure or rule” [Department Manual Section
1.121].
    Despite written policies that require Department personnel to accept complaints
from any source at any time, the panel learned of instances in which complaints were
not taken when first made and citizens were told to come back at another time or go to
another location. Though few in number, such instances become magnified in
importance as they are reported through the community.
    Further in this report, recommendations made by the panel direct themselves,
in part, to what are considered deficiencies in the investigatory process. At a
minimum, problems of the nature described above have created the perception among
some citizens and employees that IIS and the Department do not take their complaints
seriously or that personal criteria or relationships are used to determine how to proceed
with particular complaints. These perceptions can influence whether a citizen or
employee will come forward to file a complaint. Having a system which creates these
perceptions is also unfair to the men and women of the Department who go about their
tasks every day with the highest of ethical standards and professional integrity.
    Public perception about the Department’s commitment to vigorous
investigation of citizen complaints is also affected by what the public knows about the
complaint procedure itself. The Department has made considerable advances in
reaching the citizens of Seattle and in creating a strong and positive relationship with
members of the community. As part of that effort, the Department has published
several brochures and other outreach items to inform the public of its rights and of the
process for filing complaints. This information is made available in several languages
and designed to reach certain target audiences such as youths, business owners,
professionals and foreign nationals. Unfortunately, the Department’s efforts in these
areas have not been wholly consistent. For example, the Department manual made
available to the public in the downtown branch of the city library fails to include the
section detailing its IIS policies and procedures, which were adopted over two years
ago.
    Although most complaints are properly handled, the panel found occasions in
which IIS is burdened with the investigation of complaints regarding the performance
of an officer that should be handled at the precinct or section level. The classification
of a complaint should be initially determined by IIS and subsequently investigated
either by IIS or as a line investigation [Department Manual 1.121.VIII.A.2]. The
Department’s policy of handling complaints at the precinct level is wholly appropriate
if the matter involves a failure in performance on the part of an officer, although even
in these cases, a record of the complaint and its disposition should be maintained by
the IIS. When the complaint involves an issue of officer misconduct, as distinct from
performance, then the jurisdiction of IIS should be automatic and a matter of the
highest priority. A failure in the Department to distinguish between complaints
involving performance and those involving misconduct frequently results in IIS
handling complaints that could be resolved at the precinct level and cases processed at
the precinct that clearly warrant IIS investigation.
    The lack of information during the process, and the inability to provide
ongoing information, also discourages some citizens from pursuing what they perceive
to be a meaningless effort. Some citizens feel that the standards used by IIS to
determine whether a complaint is sustained or not are unclear and, in instances where a
complaint is not sustained, the citizen has no way to discover whether the complaint
was handled appropriately. Youths and citizens of color are especially apt to feel that
their complaints are ignored or improperly handled. On rare occasions, the fear of
retaliation is a barrier that inhibits citizens from filing complaints, especially among
persons who have regular contact with officers, such as “street people” and business
owners of such establishments as bars, pool halls, entertainment venues, and small
retail stores.
    The panel learned of a number of cases in which citizens were cited for crimes
or infractions under circumstances that the citizen felt to be retaliatory. The officer
then failed to appear for court and the charges or infraction was dismissed.
Alternatively, sometimes persons are arrested and then released without a charge being
filed. A cursory review of municipal court records does demonstrate that a number of
cases are dismissed because police officers fail to appear. When citizens fail to appear,
a warrant can be issued for their arrest. The Department and the City Attorney’s
Office should determine the number of cases dismissed annually because of officers’
failure to appear. The Department needs to clarify policies that require officers to
appear at all hearings and impose discipline, when appropriate, for failure to appear.
    When cases of misconduct occur and either go unreported or, as in other cases
examined by the panel, are handled in a less than satisfactory manner, the question of
leadership of the Department is inevitably and appropriately raised. While the
executive staff of the Department must perform the wide range of responsibilities
attendant to running any agency of its size, no responsibility is more important than
maintaining the highest ethical and professional standards. As a society, we entrust
too much to the police to expect otherwise. The expectations and tone for maintaining
these professional standards must start with the Chief and work down to every level in
the Department. Because it is at the heart of the police function, it is necessary to offer
an assessment of the manner in which the Department generally and the Chief
specifically have dealt with this and other situations in which professional standards
have not been met.
    Chief Stamper, at the time of his appointment, made the establishment of
positive relations between the Department and various disaffected segments of the
Seattle community one of his major priorities. He has devoted a considerable amount
of time and attention to this effort and it has been a productive engagement. The
citizens of Seattle can be grateful that issues and incidents which have been the source
of intense conflict between the police and the public in other U.S. cities are not causes
of tension here. For this, credit must be given to Chief Stamper and to those men and
women in the Department who take its statement of mission, vision and core values
seriously. A positive relationship with the community is also the cornerstone of any
successful internal investigations process. How a community feels about the
Department as a whole will influence greatly its confidence in the IIS.
    In devoting time and effort to establishing better external relations between the
Department and the Seattle community, many matters of internal management have
been left to the Department’s executive staff. While this delegation of responsibility is
in accord with the best principles of management in the private sector, it does not
always serve well in police agencies, particularly when matters of misconduct - their
investigation and adjudication - are at issue. The panel believes that until recently the
Chief has not made the reporting and investigation of allegations of misconduct a
sufficient priority. He has delegated too much of his responsibility in these areas
away, he has allowed cases to be resolved in a questionable manner and contrary to
Department regulations, and he has not insisted on or participated in adequate training
on issues pertaining to ethics. To his credit, the Chief has recognized some of these
shortcomings. He recently issued his own twelve-point plan to address some of these
concerns.

C.     Departmental Policies, Procedures and Training Regarding Employee
Responsibility     for Disclosing and Investigating Allegations of Misconduct
    There is no lack of policies, regulations and procedures in the Seattle Police
Department regarding an officer’s or civilian employee’s responsibility to report
incidents of misconduct to proper authorities and detailing the Department’s
mechanisms for investigating such incidents. As is the case in many agencies and
organizations, the problem is not whether there are sufficient rules in place but whether
those rules are given sufficient emphasis and priority, whether they are implemented
with fairness and consistency, and whether there is a clear, unambiguous
understanding throughout the Department that every employee - sworn and civilian - is
subject to them.

    I.     Policies, Procedures and Training which define employee
responsibility to disclose alleged misconduct.
    The conduct and behavior of police officers, together with Department civilian
employees, is referenced in a number of sections of the Department’s Manual of
Policies and Procedures [see chapters 29: Rules of Conduct; 117; Public and Internal
Complaint Process; 121: Investigation of Citizen and Internal Complaints; 125: EEO
Complaints and Investigations; 129: Harassment in the Workplace]. Taken together,
there is no question that the Seattle Police Department has a policy that requires its
employees to report misconduct, that obligates employees to tell the truth in their
statements, and that mandates anyone in a supervisory capacity to report misconduct to
the Internal Investigations Unit.
    What is lacking is a concise statement that specifies in unequivocal terms the
conduct that the core values of the Department dictate [e.g., that dishonesty, deception,
failure to report are grounds for termination]. What is known in other police agencies
as a “Bright Line Policy” so-called because of its especial importance and significance,
needs to be adopted by the Department and distributed to all officers, beginning with
the academy training process.
    The Department should revamp both its ethics training of officers and its
training of IIS personnel. It is the panel’s distinct impression that the portion of the
training program devoted to issues of ethics and professional responsibility is
inadequate and is not provided by an executive officer of sufficient rank to make clear
the central importance of ethics and professional integrity in the work and career of a
police officer. Currently, there is no post-academy training that deals with ethics and
that offered in the academy is limited to four hours. New officers will not come to
understand that ethics and professional integrity are the bedrock of their duties unless
the Department singles this area out from the welter of rules and regulations to which
officers are subject and makes it the centerpiece of their work.
    Giving officers a new and heightened appreciation for the importance of
professional integrity in their work would be aided by a policy that treats minor
violations as matters for training, rather than as occasions for discipline. An early
warning system as a supplement to the administrative review process that identifies
officers whose work record reflects problems in dealing with the public or with
ambiguous field situations and that is implemented as a part of the Department’s
training program, rather than as a disciplinary process, would likely lessen officer
antagonism toward the investigations section, as well as offer increased opportunities
for improving performance. It would also make a clear distinction between
inappropriate conduct that training can ameliorate and serious misconduct which must
be sanctioned.
    It also came to the panel’s attention that the Department suspended
performance evaluations over a year ago so a better system could be put in place.
Performance evaluations are an indispensable management tool for assessing and
measuring the individual efforts of Department employees, for identifying areas on
which training programs should be focused, and for gauging the Department’s progress
toward achieving its objectives. In the panel’s judgment, it is essential that an annual
performance evaluation system be restored as soon as possible.

    II.     Policies, Procedures and Training Programs which define Internal
Investigations Section responsibilities for investigating allegations of
misconduct .
    The IIS has had, in some respects, a troubled history in the Seattle Police Department. It
was established only three decades ago in response to a major scandal and a subsequent review of
the Department by the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Since that time, the IIS at
various times has been subject to various influences - collective bargaining agreements, the
misuse of IIS investigations to prevent favorable and unfavorable reports from affecting
promotional opportunities, the assignment of cases to IIS that clearly involve officer performance
issues, rather than misconduct. In addition, there are non-IIS actions by officers in the
Department that affect public perceptions of IIS, such as the practice of citing a citizen who files a
complaint for some law violation but failing to appear in court for its prosecution. In spite of
these past problems and current limitations, the IIS has shown slow but marked improvement in
the performance of its responsibilities. Based on the IIS Auditor reports, the overall volume of
complaints [including unnecessary force] is down by two-thirds since 1994. In addition, most
investigations are completed within forty days. Also, the rate of sustained cases continues to
improve, along with the termination of officers for misconduct. Outside barometers of
performance, such as claims or lawsuits and shots fired by officers, are within reasonable limits -
particularly when compared with other urban police agencies.
    The reasons for these improved statistics are probably varied. The panel has heard from
citizens who believe the filing of a complaint is not welcomed or taken seriously. This could be a
factor. However, it is also relevant to note that the rates of crime are down in Seattle. The Seattle
Police Department is a more diverse force than a few years ago, and better police work in the
community could also be a factor.
    Lending impetus to this improvement was the creation, in December, 1991, of the Internal
Investigations Auditor by the City Council. In reviewing the reports of the Auditor since 1992,
the panel has seen the Auditor’s positive impact on the complaint investigative process. The
Auditor has performed an invaluable service that has been part of an evolutionary process which
leads to the oversight and other recommendations made in this report.
    In general, the panel is impressed by the thoroughness with which officers in the Internal
Investigations Section currently carry out what is admittedly a thankless task in any police
agency. As policies, rules and regulations are no stronger or more effective than the efforts of
those who implement them, it is vitally important that this unit continue to be staffed by officers
who are committed to carry out its responsibilities with professional diligence and integrity.
    There are indications that, in the past, the Department has not always implemented rules
and regulations already in place regarding its internal investigations procedures. In more than one
instance, the panel found that the requirement for conducting administrative reviews of officers
who have received a specified number of complaints within a given period has not been adhered
to; nor is the documents-retention schedule for investigations always followed. In brief, a
consistent application of Department policies remains a goal rather than an accomplishment of the
Department.
    In spite of the diligence of the IIS staff, the Internal Investigations Sections suffers from a
lack of trust in its operations both from police officers and from a considerable number of
citizens. Internally, investigation units are not popular with the police rank-and-file and are
perceived by some not to be fair and consistent; externally, large segments of the public are
suspicious of any mechanism that essentially allows the police to investigate allegations of
misconduct of their own colleagues. Beyond these general dissatisfactions, the panel finds that
there have been some instances in which investigations were not always complete or accurate.
    Policies, rules and regulations governing internal investigations are themselves governed
by collective bargaining agreements between the city and the several guilds and associations that
represent Department employees, both sworn and civilian. For sworn staff, these agreed
procedures specify the manner in which an officer must be informed of a complaint regarding his
or her conduct, the form and time frame of the officer’s response, the way in which the Internal
Investigations Section can conduct interviews with the officer, and require the Department to
destroy internal investigation files three years after the year in which the investigation was
initiated. The Seattle Police Department may be one of the only law enforcement agencies in the
nation which has agreed not to routinely conduct in-person interviews of employees against whom
complaints have been filed, which must submit interview questions to employees in advance and,
if additional misconduct comes to the attention of the interviewer, must give formal notice of that
fact prior to further inquiry. The current policy affords Seattle Police Department employees
more rights and protections than those granted to citizens. In essence, current policy obliges the
Department to conduct most investigations of misconduct by correspondence.
    The panel finds this set of circumstances to be quite incompatible with the best traditions
of police management and with procedures followed in most other police departments in the
United States. How the Internal Investigations Section conducts its investigations should be
governed by the best investigative practices, not by collective bargaining agreements. In the
agreements, discipline is acknowledged as a command function [i.e., a responsibility of
Department management] but it is also defined as a grievance procedure. As a consequence, a
significant number of management responsibilities and prerogatives have been preempted by the
grievance process, restricting the Department’s ability to investigate and discipline its personnel.
It must be noted that the Seattle Police Guild has made clear to the panel that it has participated -
and is willing to continue to do so - in interest-based bargaining on these issues.
    The effectiveness of the internal investigations process is further hampered by a
Department procedure known as an IIS Supervisory Referral [Department Manual
1.121.VIII.A.1]. According to a Department memorandum, this classification “is used when the
allegation of misconduct is minor and, even if proven, would not constitute a significant violation
of any policy, procedure or rule....” In a particularly troubling case which the panel has reviewed
and which has already received media coverage, a complaint which might have met the legal
definition of extortion was classified as a supervisory referral. In violation of the Department’s
manual, the referral was sent from IIS to the administrative levels of the Department and resulted
in only a letter of apology to the complainant, with no formal sanction imposed on the
investigated officer.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
    The panel submits its recommendations under four categories which reflect the major
areas of concern that the Department and the city should address. Many of these
recommendations affect matters of policy or resources that are beyond the Department’s capacity
to implement. It is vital that the issues of city policy be considered as well as those that deal with
internal department regulations and procedures.

A. Oversight
    A key to public respect for and trust of the police lies in how complaints of police
misconduct will be investigated. Both in the extended presentations made to this panel by citizens
and in the case that brought about the panel’s creation, this fundamental issue is raised and
requires a response. What is required is an investigatory system that will ensure allegations of
wrongdoing are probed thoroughly by a process that will be seen as fair by both citizens and the
police.
    The panel examined a number of models for oversight of the investigative process with a
view toward recommending whatever might be considered best for Seattle. It specifically
reviewed and rejected the concept of a civilian review board in the conviction that removing
responsibility for dealing with police misconduct from the executive management of the
Department and ultimately from its chief would accomplish the precise opposite of what should
be the primary objective of any oversight process, to fix accountability where it properly belongs.

Recommendation One:
    The panel therefore recommends the creation of an Office of Professional Accountability
[OPA] to replace the present Internal Investigations Section. The OPA would also subsume the
duties of the Internal Investigations Auditor. The OPA should be headed by a civilian director
who has legal, investigative, or prosecutorial experience, and an assistant director, chosen by the
director, who is either a civilian or a sworn officer. The director would be appointed by the Chief
of Police and confirmed by the City Council at a salary consistent with the level of responsibility
herein proposed. The Director would be responsible for the investigative, adjudicative, and
administrative functions of the police disciplinary process, would manage the overall
investigative, adjudicative, training, and administrative functions of the OPA and, in cases where
complaints are sustained, would recommend disciplinary actions to the Chief of Police. The
Director would report directly to and meet regularly with the Chief; his/her appointment would be
for a fixed term and subject to renewal. The OPA would continue the best current policies of the
IIS as well as adopt the recommendations of the panel.
    It is essential to the effective functioning of this post for the Director to understand that
his/her responsibility is to protect the rights of all officers and employees of the Seattle Police
Department as well as the rights of all citizens, to enforce those rights of citizens and officers with
equal diligence and fairness, and to ensure that those rights are scrupulously observed.
    The OPA should provide a mechanism for citizens and officers to express their concerns in
a confidential, non-threatening manner and environment. The Office should give citizens and
police officers a recourse through which to bring problems to light and thereby assist the
Department in the performance of its duties. The OPA should establish special procedures for the
taking and investigation of complaints by juveniles, and assign investigators with an interest in
and talent for working with youths to such cases.
    The Office of Professional Accountability would be composed of the Director, the
Assistant Director, the personnel of the present Internal Investigations Section. The OPA would
have the power to receive complaints from officers and citizens regarding police misconduct. Its
mandate should be sufficiently broad to enable it to treat any legitimate concern as a “complaint.”
Such complaints need not be in writing and may be from third parties, witnesses, or anonymous
sources. There should be no restriction on the form a complaint can take. Telephone, facsimile
and e-mail complaints would be permitted in addition to oral or written complaints. An
appropriate complaint form should be made available to elicit the necessary information. As the
outcome of a complaint can be greatly affected by its categorization or by the witnesses chosen to
be interviewed, the Director of the OPA should personally approve the categorization of every
complaint filed and satisfy him/herself of the thoroughness of the investigation.
    The OPA should also have the power to initiate its own investigations as it deems
appropriate or necessary. It should be able to investigate matters revealed as a result of a
complaint even if the original complaint involved a different matter. It should be authorized to
investigate and make findings whenever civil or criminal litigation reveals a probability of police
misconduct, and should be able to pursue an investigation regardless of whether an officer
chooses to resign or retire either in anticipation or reaction to a complaint. Its findings should
continue, as is currently the case, to be based on a standard of preponderance of the evidence,
should take the form of detailed written findings including a description of the alleged facts, the
facts revealed by the OPA investigation, the rule or rules being applied to determine whether
misconduct occurred, and the reasoning as to whether the rule or rules were violated.
    The OPA should establish guidelines for threshold screening of complaints. The
guidelines should ensure that frivolous, malicious and irrelevant complaints do not survive the
screening process, without unduly screening out complaints that may prove meritorious upon
investigation. Complaints should not be screened out where there is sufficient cause to warrant
further investigation. Complaints screened out prior to investigation will remain confidential but
may be considered in an administrative review or early warning process.
    The OPA will be expected to complete all investigations within sixty days of the
complaint, unless circumstances warrant additional time. The Office will be expected to issue a
decision as to whether the complaint is sustained, not sustained, unfounded, exonerated within
sixty days of the completion of the investigation and to notify the complainant and the officer of
the decision within seven days of the decision. The Chief of Police will be expected to make
decisions on any discipline within thirty days of all sustained complaint resolutions.
    Mediation of complaints, as is provided under the current IIS system, should be retained.
Mediation allows parties to resolve a complaint in a confidential manner that is agreeable to all
parties. Mediated complaints should be tracked and may be used for administrative review or
early warning purposes, or as an occasion for a policy recommendation.
    The OPA’s findings would be referred directly to the Chief of Police with
recommendations for discipline, where warranted. To ensure consistency of discipline, the OPA
shall develop a formal range of discipline for misconduct cases. The OPA is urged to take note of
the panel’s recommendations regarding a “Bright Line” policy in this effort. The Chief shall be
responsible for making the final determination as to discipline and may, for good cause and in
writing, modify the adjudicative findings of the Director. The OPA would adopt procedures to
ensure that the complainant is kept informed of the process from its initiation to conclusion.
Complainants would have the right to be interviewed at a time and place convenient and
comfortable to them and to have counsel present, if they wish.
    Policies for handling complaints that allege criminal conduct by officers would be adopted
to ensure that the King County Prosecutor’s Office and the Office of the City Attorney are
appropriately involved. The Seattle Police Department should continue its collaborative policy
with the Seattle office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
    The City should adopt the policy that upon the completion of an IIS investigation,
complainants shall be entitled to a copy of the IIS investigation file after redactions are made,
pursuant to the law set forth in Cowles Publishing v. State Patrol, 109 Wn2d 712, 748 P. 2d 597
(1988). This policy will apply to all IIS investigations, regardless of the finding. Complainants
should be informed of that right in the letter from IIS reporting on the completion of the
investigation and the office’s findings. The OPA should retain all internal investigation records
permanently.
    Finally, the OPA would adopt and publish a detailed manual for its investigators
describing its procedures which also would be readily available to the public. The manual should
contain a rule specifying that the OPA investigators are prohibited from receiving ‘off the record’
information of misconduct and that they have a duty to report any misconduct of which they
become aware to the Director. Failure to do so should result in termination. The manual and
regular updates would be distributed to libraries, organizations and agencies with an interest in
police issues, and posted on the city’s web site. The Director would issue regular reports to the
Mayor and City Council describing the work of the OPA and making recommendations for policy
changes as he/she sees fit. The OPA staff would meet regularly with community groups and
would recommend to the Chief of Police changes in policy or areas where training bulletins are
needed. If the Department implements integrity testing as proposed in the Chief’s twelve-point
plan, it should be administered by the OPA.

B. Leadership
Recommendation Two:
    The Chief should issue a “bright line” rule stating that lying, cheating, or stealing will not
be tolerated by the Department and will result in termination. The rule should specifically
include lying or withholding material information in the course of an internal investigation.

Recommendation Three:
    It is essential, in the panel’s view, that the Chief have a more direct and authoritative role
in the training and the internal investigations process: meeting on a regular basis with the Director
of OPA, personally reviewing the findings in all investigations where serious violations have been
alleged or occur, and determining - not merely approving - the appropriate discipline. The Chief,
the Director of the OPA and members of the Senior Leadership Team should participate in
academy training, thus clearly setting the tone on these vital issues from the start of an officer’s
career. Individual responsibility, not work group responsibility, must be made the standard of
Department professionalism.

Recommendation Four:
    The Chief should appoint a high-level person in the Department who will have overall
responsibility to oversee compliance with the law, the Department’s ethical standards, and the
Department’s procedures which have been developed to enforce them. This appointee should be
designated as the Department’s ethics officer. The ethics officer should be appointed minimally
at the rank of captain and would be:
"    responsible for developing a compliance program which periodically reviews all rules and
regulations, and assures that Department personnel understand the rules and follow them,
"    available for consultation by Department personnel who have questions about
these rules or how to follow them,
"    responsible for reporting to the Chief on the implementation of the compliance
program.

Recommendation Five:
    Sergeants should be provided with additional managerial training regarding
their duties and obligations in general and their responsibility concerning complaints
of misconduct in particular. Sergeants are the first level of management and bear a
responsibility for carrying out Department policies.

Recommendation Six:
    The Department should review whether position and budget cuts have reduced
the ability of supervisors to perform the critical role of supervising and managing
officers. This is particularly important in those areas where the opportunity for
corruption is greater [e.g., vice and narcotics]. The city should fund new positions if
these are necessary for the efficient management of the Department or the reduction of
the chances for potential corruption.

Recommendation Seven:
    The Department should institute a more comprehensive “early warning system”
to supplement the administrative review process. It should identify officers whose
performance or behavior is problematic and assist officers in succeeding in the
Department rather than being subjected to a system that functions as a form of
discipline. This can be successful only if supervisors, particularly sergeants, have the
time and the resources to do their jobs proactively.

Recommendation Eight:
    Supervisors should be held accountable for a pattern of misconduct allegations
in their squads. A threshold number of complaints should initiate an administrative
review of a supervisor, just as it does of an officer.

Recommendation Nine:
    Officers should be transferred and supervisors rotated in their assignments with
greater frequency. The need for expertise in specialized units should be balanced with
the problems that can arise when officers and supervisors remain in one area for an
overly long period.

Recommendation Ten:
    All commanders, supervisors, and officers regularly should be reminded of
their duty to receive complaints from citizens whenever and wherever they are made.

Recommendation Eleven:
    The Department and the City Attorney’s office should review annually the
number of cases dismissed because of the failure of an officer to appear in court. The
Department should clarify its policy requiring officers to appear at all hearings and
impose discipline, when appropriate, for failure to appear.

Recommendation Twelve:
    A key to consistent performance is consistent expectations and enforcement of
those expectations. The Department has gone without performance evaluations for too
long and should resume the evaluation process as soon as possible. Every supervisory
employee should be evaluated specifically on whether he/she consistently articulates
and enforces Department expectations in the areas of ethics and the reporting and
handling of complaints of misconduct. The performance evaluations of all Department
employees also should include a performance evaluation element which addresses
compliance with the law and Department regulations.

C. Training
Recommendation Thirteen:
    The hours devoted to training officers on issues related to ethics and
misconduct needs to be increased. Presently, the Department provides new recruits
with 600 hours of academy and post-basic training. Less than fifteen hours are devoted
to the topics of ethics, integrity and IIS policies and procedures. The panel
understands that this is part of a larger issue and that the Department budget is only
$39 per officer annually for training (excluding grants). The additional training
recommended by the panel shall not come at the expense of other needed training;
post-academy training, for example, is especially important on a variety of policing
issues.

Recommendation Fourteen:
    Ethics and internal investigative policies and procedures should be taught as
companion subjects, in conjunction with one another. Currently, the two areas are
presented as if they were two separate issues. The Department should review and
revamp the materials provided in the academy in the areas of ethics. The materials
currently provided to new officers do not specify the Department’s expectations
regarding ethics and the reporting of misconduct, and do not include the Department’s
code of conduct or the rules and regulations governing complaints of misconduct.

Recommendation Fifteen:
    The training materials on ethics and internal investigations should be included
and distributed in notebooks with all other materials given to new recruits at the
beginning of the academy. According to the Department, currently, this is not done; it
minimizes their importance for new recruits.

Recommendation Sixteen:
    The Department guidelines and procedures related to the taking and
investigation of complaints against employees should be included in the Department
manual and distributed to every officer. Every officer should be required to affirm in
writing, on an annual basis, that the officer has read the Department Manual,
understands it, and will abide by it.

Recommendation Seventeen:
    The training of OPA investigators is inadequate, as is the $1200 training
budget for this section. The OPA investigators should be detective-level personnel,
should be given additional training when they are assigned to the unit, and their
assignments should become a route to favorable promotions in the Department. The
Department should consider making an assignment in IIS eligible for specialty pay [as
in homicide, the motorcycle division, et. al].

Recommendation Eighteen:
    More resources need to be devoted to the OPA. The clerical support staff
should be upgraded in rank and possibly positions added. The workload and duties
justify this. In addition, the computer system and equipment is inadequate. The lack
of an automated system allows complaints to become lost and hinders both the
efficient review of complaints and, where it is warranted, the imposition of discipline.
All records should be fully computerized.

D. Rules/Process
    All across the United States, cities have opted for policies that trade
management rights for higher pay. Seattle is not an exception. As a consequence, the
city, as noted earlier, has agreed to relinquish a significant number of management
functions and prerogatives involving the investigation of officer misconduct to the
collective bargaining process.

Recommendation Nineteen:
    It is the panel’s firm conviction that the investigation of police misconduct is
one of the chief responsibilities of Department management and should be governed
by the best investigative practices, not collective bargaining. Accordingly, the panel
recommends that Department policies and union agreements be changed to reflect the
following policies:
"    In the course of any investigation, be the allegation a violation of Department
regulation or a violation of law, the Department may, in the discretion of the
investigator, conduct a personal face-to-face interview of the subject employee
and any potential witnesses [Manual Section 1.121.X.A and B; SPOGA Sec.
3.5]
"    The Department will not be obligated to submit in advance to the employee the
questions the investigator intends to ask during an interview [Manual Section
1.121.X.B; SPOGA Sec. 3.7.D.2.].
"    During the interview of an employee as part of an IIS investigation, the
investigator will be authorized to inquire about any rule or law violation
discovered during the course of the interview, regardless of whether it is related
to the subject of the investigation [Manual Section 1.121.X.C; SPOGA Sec.
3.7.D.3.].
"    There shall be no limitation on the number of investigative complaints which
would give rise to the initiation of an administrative review [SPOGA 3.5].
Department management shall be allowed to conduct an administrative review
of an officer whenever it has reason to believe circumstances warrant.
"    While the confidentiality of IIS files during the course of an investigation must
be maintained, it is in the public interest to treat these files as public records and
to make them available to interested members of the public after redactions are
made, pursuant the law set forth in Cowles Publishing v. State Patrol, 109 Wn2d
712, 748 P.2d 597 (1988). [SPOGA Sec. 3.7.J.].
"    Since IIS files are beneficial to the Department and the employee, they shall be
maintained permanently [SPOGA Sec. 3.7.K.].
"    Any voluntary, non-compelled statement made by a Department employee
during any Complaint Hearing may be used against that employee in a criminal
prosecution [SPOGA 3.6.I.].
"    All employees will be expected and obligated to assist in any Department
investigation and to answer all questions truthfully. Any false statement made
by an employee should be the subject of discipline and, depending upon the
circumstances, may be used against that employee.
"    In the case of criminal investigation or prosecution of an employee, any
disciplinary hearing should be deferred until the criminal matter is completed.
"    Any employee who receives the discipline of suspension will not be allowed to
exchange vacation, holiday or compensatory time for the suspension [SPOGA
Sec. 3.6.N.].
"    For the sake of continuity, the citizen member appointed by the Mayor to
Complaint Advisory Boards should be the same person. The employee should
not use a peremptory challenge for that citizen member. [SPOGA Sec. 3.6.D.].
"    Either the Department or the employee may record the Complaint Advisory
Board hearing SPOGA Sec. 3.6.G.].

Recommendation Twenty:
    While the Department has rules regarding the reporting of misconduct, the
panel believes the obligation of officers to do so and the sanctions for failing to do so
need to be more clearly stated.

Recommendation Twenty-One:
    The Department should highlight its rule that prohibits retaliation against any
employee or citizen who files a complaint of misconduct.

Recommendation Twenty-Two:
    The Equal Employment Opportunity Office should be removed from the
Internal Investigations Section and placed in the Human Resources Division. The
Department should institute a rule that precludes an OPA investigation of an employee
who has an EEO claim against the Department unless the Chief personally authorizes
such an investigation. This will lessen the concern of employees that retaliatory
investigations are a practice of the Department.

Recommendation Twenty-Three:
    New and separate office locations should be found for OPA and EEO that are
easily accessible for both employees and civilians.

IV. CONCLUSION
    The immense media attention and public concern of the past six months,
created by an alleged theft of nearly three years ago, suggests that some effort should
be made by the panel to place that incident and the work of this panel in perspective.
The incident occurred during a period in which great strides have been made in
building a climate of trust and confidence between the Seattle police and the Seattle
citizenry, particularly segments of the community that have been alienated from the
Department and its efforts.
    In the course of its inquiry, the panel found it necessary to examine other
allegations of wrongdoing in the Police Department some of which, in the panel’s
judgment, warranted serious examination or reinvestigation. It is important to note,
however, that some allegations presented to the panel dealt with incidents that
occurred ten to twenty years ago. While the panel sought to examine every serious
concern brought to its attention, a fair and objective appraisal leads to the conclusion
that if the number of allegations of misconduct reported to the panel are any indication
of the standard of professionalism and integrity in the Seattle Police Department, then
the Department is a very good department indeed.
    If the panel were convinced,
after four months of probing examination, that the Seattle Police Department was
systemically flawed or poorly managed, it would not hesitate to say so. It is the
conviction that an essentially good Department can be made better that has led to the
panel’s recommendations. The panel hopes the citizens of Seattle will view the
Department in a similar light and give it the critical support it deserves.

Charles V. Johnson, Chair

Michael D. McKay

Jenny A. Durkan

Burdena G. Pasenelli



Appendix

The following Seattle Police Department materials were reviewed:

"    Chief Stamper’s recent 12 step proposal
"    Numerous Internal Investigation Casefiles
"    Reports of IIS Auditor
"    A summary of tenure of all positions in SPD bureaus
"    A summary of terminations from 1992 - 1999
"    Seattle Police Department outline of Ethics and Professionalism used at the
academy
"    Seattle Police Department Evidence Procedure Manual
"    Seattle Police Department Evidence Unit Manual
"    Miscellaneous IIS flyers and brochures
"    Miscellaneous Seattle Police Department Evidence Unit forms
"    Seattle Police Department Investigation Bureau Manual of Policies and
Procedures
"    The Seattle Police Department Manual
"    Seattle Police Department Sand Point Training Curriculum, Vol. 1 & 2, and
training schedules
"    Seattle Police Department Training Manual
"    Seattle Police Department Vice and Narcotics section manual
"    Summary of sustained complaints and discipline imposed against officers by the
Seattle Police Department for 1996-1999


The following City of Seattle labor contracts were reviewed:

"    Agreement with the Seattle Police Managment Association
"    Agreement with the Seattle Police Officers Guild
"    Agreement with the Professional, Technical, Senior Business, Senior
Professional Administrative Support Union (International Federation of
Professional and Technical Engineers Local #17, AFL-CIO)
"    Agreement with Joint Crafts Council
"    Agreement with Teamsters Local 117, Evidence Warehouser Unit and
Community Service Officer Unit
"    Agreement with Seattle Parking Enforcement Officers’ Association



The following supplementary materials were reviewed by the panel:

"    The Albuquerque Police Oversight Task Force Report
"    The Bell Report (Seattle Police Department Internal Complaint Handling: A
Review and Evaluation), by M.M. Bell, Peter Moy and Associates, Lukin and
Associates (November 15, 1989)
"    The Buracker Study (The Seattle Police Department Management Study), by
Carroll Buracker & Associates (1989)
"    Commission Report, City of New York Commission to Investigate Allegations
of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police
Department (July 7, 1994)
"    An ethics outline used by the state at the state academy
"    The ethics outline used by the Washington State Patrol for new recruit training
"    The International Association of Chiefs of Police Report (A Survey of the
Police Department: Seattle, WA), by the Field Operations Division International
Association of Chiefs of Police (June, 1968)
"    The Municipal Code Section of the Seattle Ethics and Elections Commission
"    The Policy and Procedure manual of the Seattle Medical Examiner’s Office
"    The Portland Police Bureau 1998 Community Assessment Survey
"    The San Jose Office of the Independent Police Auditor 1998 Year End Report
"    The Seattle Whistleblower ordinance
"    Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies: The Standards Manual of the Law
Enforcement Agency Accreditation Program, by the Commission on
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. (August, 1983)
"    The Washington State Patrol Regulation Manual
"    The Seattle Ordinance Establishing IIS Auditor
"    Report and Recommendation relating to Raburn/Baldwin Indictment, November
16, 1984


The following materials submitted by the ACLU were reviewed:

"    A Call for Accountability: Steps to Reform Investigations of Police Misconduct
(August 1993)
"    On the Line: Police Brutality and its Remedies (April 1991)
"    Portland, OR, Citizen Advisors Third Quarter 1997 Monitoring Report to the
Police Internal Investigations Auditing Committee (October 30, 1997)
"    Recommendations for Changes in Seattle Police Operations To Improve
Accountability and the Complaint Review Process (July 10, 1992)
"    Report of the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington on the Seattle
Police Auditor Proposal (November 20, 1991)
"    Miscellaneous correspondence to the Seattle Police Department, the Seattle
Police Department Internal Investigations Auditor, and other city officials.

Internal Investigations Procedures and/or the manuals of the following police
departments or agencies were reviewed:

"    Albuquerque
"    Commission on Law Enforcement Accreditation (CALEA)
"    Charleston
"    Chicago
"    Denver
"    Federal Bureau of Investigation
"    International Association of Chiefs of Police
"    King County Sheriff
"    Los Angeles Police Department
"    Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office
"    North Carolina Highway Patrol
"    New York Police Department
"    San Jose
"    Washington State Patrol


Internal Affairs Investigation statistics or reports from the following cities were
reviewed:

"    Indianapolis, IN
"    Oakland, CA
"    Phoenix, AZ
"    Portland, OR
"    Sacramento, CA
"    Salt Lake City, UT
"    San Francisco, CA
"    San Jose, CA
"    Tucson, AZ

The OPA must comply with the Constitutional rights of officers under current law [e.g.
self-incrimination rights as guaranteed under Garrity and Gardner] which stipulate the
officer must submit to interviews and cooperate in investigations but statements are
considered compelled and cannot be used in criminal prosecutions. Officers also are
assured whistleblower protection from management retaliation if they file a complaint
with OPA.